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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change produces significant social and economic impacts in most parts of
the world, thus global action is needed to address climate change. In this paper, I
explore the different possibilities of mitigation from different points of view, and
analyse the possibilities of adaptation to climate change. 
First, substantial reduction of GHG emissions is needed, on the other hand
adaptation action must deal with the inevitable impacts. According to my assess-
ment, it is essential that coordinated actions be taken at an EU level. In my argu-
mentation I will use a macroeconomic model for the cost-benefit analysis of GHG
gas emissions reduction. I will analyse the GHG emission structure on a European
and world level.
Even in the case of a successful mitigation strategy there rest the long-term
effects of climate change which will need a coherent adaptation strategy to be
dealt with. Although certain adaptation measures already have been taken, these
initiatives are still very modest, and insufficient to deal with the economic effects
of climate change properly. 
2. WHY SHOULD WE DEAL WITH CLIMATE CHANGE?
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report
the increase observed in global temperatures is very likely to be a consequence of
the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations. Therefore, on a larger scale, human
actions have an effect on the ocean warming, continental average temperatures
and wind patterns [IPCC, 2007]. According to cited report, a further increase of
1.8 to 4 ?C of global expected average surface temperature can be expected (There
are different scenarios but they all coincide in that temperatures will keep rising.)
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Climate change affects both economy and society in several ways throughout
the world. Therefore, well-targeted global and regional actions must be taken.
In this paper I assess the different options for climate change mitigation poli-
cies and analyse the possibilities of adaptation methods. I will focus on three
aspects: cost-efficiency, innovation and flexibility.
If we would like to assess the damages caused by climate change and the ben-
efits of mitigation, we must take into consideration market and non-market dam-
ages as well. In the case of market damages, welfare impacts should be studied. As
a result of the rise of temperature and the scarcity of goods, there will be signifi-
cant changes in price structures and the quantity of certain goods. 
Some sectors such as agriculture, forestry, water supply, energy supply are par-
ticularly affected by climate change. Such impact is quite difficult to be quanti-
fied. For instance, in agriculture land prices or rent can be good indicators.
However in the case of products, substitution effect must be taken into account.
So-called non-market damages are lot more difficult to estimate. There are consid-
erable welfare costs from lost biodiversity and harmed ecosystems and there are
utility losses from the less favourable weather [Nordhaus, 2007].
According to the data of the World Resources Institute the most important con-
tributors to GHG emission are the energy sector, transport, agriculture, and land
use, including forestry. 
A rise in prices will result in lower demand and in a decrease in GDP. Climate
change produces substantial costs to the world economy. According to the key
study, the Stern Report elaborated in 2007, the costs of climate change sum up to
the 5 percent of the global GDP.
There are various commitments of the states. The first and the most impor-
tant is the Kyoto Protocol. The EU has committed itself to a reduction of 8 per-
cent of the emissions from 2008 to 2012 compared to the 1990 levels. The EU
made an ambitious plan of reducing emissions by 20 percent up to 2020, in the
future, an alleged post-Kyoto agreement would project a reduction of 30 per-
cent whereas on the long run, a reduction of 50 percent would be necessary by
2050.
How to achieve these ambitious plans? Governments have different policy
options. Possible economic instruments are with regard to market-conform gov-
ernment measures: the introduction of energy/emissions taxes, setting up of GHG
emissions trading schemes. Other, rather redistributive options are the adoption
and the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, and the introduction of efficiency
standards and labelling systems. 
Each of these measures aim at changing the incentives of the economic actors,
which is very hard, even impossible on the short run. Therefore, these policies
must set such market conditions that give motivations for companies to comply
with the environmental regulations. 
Moreover, the public good nature of climate [Nordhaus, 2002] must be empha-
sized, which implies per se the free rider problem [Tulkens, 1998]. This circum-
stance makes it difficult to a great extent to build a policy framework that would
be effective, i.e. that would cover all emitters. The consequence is that if policy
makers would like to increase the efficiency of these instruments, they should
apply efficient monitoring systems, which would result in enormous monitoring
costs but which, at the same time as a consequence of information problems, could
never be effective enough to prevent free riders. The existing policy instruments I
am assessing below suppose the existence of a perfect financial market, where
price functions as a perfect indicator.
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All mitigation policy instruments must meet the following objectives: be cost-
efficient, promote and facilitate innovation, diffuse GHG emission reducing tech-
nologies and be flexible to be able to respond to changes in the economy.
3. BUILDING A MACROECONOMIC MODEL
When policy makers would like to choose between different policy instruments,
they should base their choice on impact studies of each measure. When modelling
climate change mitigation, we must get the proper indicators to measure the
impacts. 
As an overall indicator, we can study changes in GDP, which however can be dis-
torted. GDP does not reflect changes in externalities, cannot capture the increase
in the security of supply and other secondary benefits that cannot be quantified.
Non-market evaluated activities are also out of the focus of an analysis that consid-
ers only changes in GDP. 
Changes in employment are even more difficult to assess. On one hand a shift
in technology, and the reduction of the production results in the decrease of real
wages, and possibly in employment.
On the other hand, from carbon intensive sectors, there can be a shift of the
labour to the green economy where there are new potentials of investment and
growth. The possibilities of the expansion of green employment depend on many
things and must be further analysed in detail.
There are two main factors to be studied: Cost effects and innovation promo-
tion.
3.1. PRICE AND COST EFFECTS
Below I will describe a model argued by Lintz [1992. pp 34–38], which is based on
neoclassical assumptions. It is assumed that quantitative restrictions on GHG emis-
sions are applied. Therefore the use of fossil fuels must be reduced. This will
change the cost structure of companies, increasing the cost burden. This will result
in lower real wages and a substitution effect to other input products. The potential
output is reduced if we consider that companies are profit maximizers. According
to this approach, a new equilibrium can be reached with full employment in the
case of flexible labour market. This model has some preconceptions that are rather
simplifying. A clear distinction must be made between short, medium and long
term effects. 
A possible but not necessary decrease on the short run can be attributed to
higher input costs, however on the long run, after a technological change was
made, the initial production will be changed, thus production can even rise com-
pared to the ex ante state. In Lintz’s analysis it is also assumed that the starting
point is Pareto optimal. However, if we assume that the starting point is subopti-
mal, the introduction of a climate change mitigation instrument will not result in
the reduction of the GDP.
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Hence, we should state that current production schemes are not efficient
enough, and efficiency can be ameliorated. In the case of the economics of climate
change, the free lunch hypothesis of Michael Porter can be used [Porter, 1990].
There are so called No-Regret Potentials i.e. economic actors can find cost-efficient
saving potentials. If companies, as a result of an increased cost burden caused by
GHG emissions restrictions, are obliged to look for and activate unused efficiency
potentials, or innovate to reduce costs, and as a result, achieve competitive advan-
tage, then mitigation policy has reached its objective [Porter, 1995]. A well-directed
environmental protection policy can therefore encourage innovation, investment in
R&D and the diffusion of low-carbon technologies [Ambec & Lanoie, 2008].
“The notion is that the imposition of regulations impels firms to reconsider
their processes and hence to discover innovative approaches to reduce pollution
and decrease costs or increase output” [Berg and Holtbrügge, 1997. p.200]. 
Nevertheless the picture is not quite clear, yet there are many factors to be con-
sidered. The former model represents companies as rational economic agents;
however, decision making processes are rather complex to be able to decide easi-
ly how companies will act in such circumstances. As I have mentioned before, a dis-
tinction must be made between short and long term. We must refer here to the
principal-agent problem. Investing in new technologies needs high R&D costs
therefore it only turns to be positive, beneficiary after a while (as suggested in
product life cycle theory). As a consequence, there is a trade-off between short-
term and long-term objectives. Innovate and be more competitive on the long run
or pay dividends, get a higher profit on the short term. 
Company decisions are, to a great extent, affected by former experiences, sunk
investments in green economy, environment-friendly production or they are dis-
torted by future uncertainties.
3.2. INNOVATION PROMOTION
As the aforementioned Lintz model suggests, GHG emission taxes will increase
costs for companies, thus will result in a decrease in the GDP. On the contrary I
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Source: Author
Figure 1. The shift of the transition curve as a result
of climate investments and technological change
assume that additional, well-selected financial burdens are expected to foster a
swift in technologies, promote investments in new technologies, innovation.
Therefore, it will result in a shift of the production frontier curve. 
In Figure 1 it can be seen that on the short run, further reduction of GHG emis-
sions will result in a decrease of production (q2), while on the long run, motivat-
ed by profit maximization, the company will invest in R&D and develop new pro-
duction techniques. Technological changes will move the production frontier
right, and extend production capacities. Production, with the same amount of
GHG emission will increase significantly. 
In theory, this can be an impressive model that proves the legitimacy of GHG
emission reduction policies. Empirical studies, however, do not agree totally with
these assumptions.
If an increase in investment volume and an increase in economic growth can
be observed, it does not necessarily mean that investments in GHG emission
reduction contributed to experimented growth. 
According to empirical studies, an increase in green investments when it is
about end-of-pipe systems will not result in economic growth, while production-
integrated environmental protection may contribute to growth. 
Table 1 provides a detailed assessment of four policy instruments.
Table 1. Policy instruments addressing climate change
Source: author
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Policy
instrument
Cost-
efficiency
Promotion of
innovation
Technology
diffusion Flexibility
Address
market
imperfections
GHG emission
taxes
RELATIVELY
High
monitoring
costs and tax
collection costs,
income for the
states
YES
Gives
incentives to
invest in R&D
to reduce emis-
sions
YES
Foster diffusion
of low-carbon
technologies
YES
Easily imple-
mented, can be
adjusted to eco-
nomic changes
possibility of
harmonization
NO
Rests the
information
problem which
entails
monitoring
difficulties
Emission
trading
schemes
NO
large
transaction and
monitoring
costs, no
perfect permit
market
PARTLY
high price
volatility,
uncertainties
PARTLY
high price
volatility,
uncertainties
PARTLY
differentiation
can be made,
difficulties in
choosing price
cap, difficulties
in incorporating
new countries.
NO
asymmetric
information,
monitoring is
difficult,
transaction
costs
CAC
approaches
NO, lag in cost
and result
costs are not
immediately
visible
LOW
does not give
innovation and
adoption incen-
tives
LOW
no incentive to
introduce more
efficient tech-
nology than
obliged
NO
do not accom-
modate to
changes
PARTLY
cover segments
not address by
market instru-
ments
Technology-
support
policies
NO
market
distortion, large
initial R&D
spending
YES
corrects
innovation
failures
YES
corrects
technology
diffusion failure
NO
do not
accommodate
to changes
PARTLY
addresses
innovation
failures
3.3. GHG EMISSION TAXES
From the point of view of cost-efficiency, there exists a double dividend from intro-
ducing CO2 emission taxes. The income generated by the tax can be “recycled” and
reinvested in CO2 reducing technologies. This might be the most cost-efficient,
and market-conform instrument of mitigation action [Parry–Bento 2000].
On one hand, it gives strong incentives for companies to introduce new tech-
nologies that would reduce GHG emissions and increase productivity at the
same time. On the other hand tax revenues can be used to finance green invest-
ments. 
Other advantage of this instrument is its flexibility. Flexibility can be consid-
ered at a national level: taxes can be adjusted to economic cycles, or changes in
demand. At an international level, it is easy to introduce and harmonise emission
taxes in two countries or in a group of countries. Tax schemes and rates can be
adjusted, and thus, climate policy can be more effective. Nevertheless, at a
European level it is rather controversial that a unique carbon tax could be intro-
duced, considering that tax schemes are not identical at all, and although the same
GHG emission tax would be introduced in all EU countries, the effect of this mea-
sure would vary from country to country in function of the existing tax scheme
and interaction with other policies.
Policy makers can opt for a swift form taxes on labour to ecological tax. That
would diminish the costs of GHG reductions and would be less distortive; howev-
er, its success would depend on existing tax system [Parry–Bento 2000].
However, there are some circumstances that influence its applicability. First it
is hard to build up public support for a tax. And the application of a tax in itself
cannot assure that companies invest in new low-carbon technologies if they can
shift increased costs on consumers. In many cases emitters have monopolistic
power therefore they are able to adjust prices to maximize their profits. As in the
case of all taxes, monitoring and tax collection costs must be taken into account,
which means that transaction costs are quite high.
According to an empirical research by Blackman and Harrington (2000), GHG
emission taxes can be applied in developed countries, however in lower income
countries institutional capacities are not ensured to enforce an emission tax.
[Owen–Hanley, 2004] Therefore transaction costs are higher than the possible rev-
enues from such taxes.  The fact that as a result of high carbon intensity in these
countries it would mean huge costs for the private sector in developing countries,
deters them from introducing such taxes. This entails the problem of the interna-
tionalization of GHM emission taxes.
It is also true that for the time being there is no strong need for a large interna-
tional harmonization of emission taxes or to set up a new international institution.
We also have to distinguish between public and private companies, yet the for-
mer does not have profit maximization as priority, they have laxer budget con-
straints, and as a consequence, they do not have enough motivation to invest in
R&D, innovations, and technological changes.
In private companies there are more incentives to reduce costs and to compete
with quality standards. 
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3.4. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES 
The introduction of this measure reflects an administrative approach to address
climate change. A central authority introduces a ceiling for the amount that can be
emitted. Companies, usually willing to overstep this limit, are obliged to obtain
more permits.
The cost-efficiency of this instrument is less proven. Permits should be fully auc-
tioned, and there should be no uncertainty with regard to emissions trade. If a per-
fect emission permit market existed, emission trading would perhaps do better,
however we are quite far from this. Transaction costs are much higher than in the
case of emission taxes, and pricing is a lot more difficult. Implementation and mon-
itoring, due to the absence of yet existing infrastructure, will produce much high-
er costs for states.
It also distorts market dynamics: modifies entry and exit circumstances, and
provides monopolistic benefit for emitters, whose emission is financed by con-
sumers.
Internationalization could be a solution to achieve higher cost-effectiveness,
but existing schemes do not allow being optimistic about it. It is not as flexible as
a tax, which can be easily moved to an international level, or even to incorporate
new participant countries. 
Political support can be achieved by “grandfathering”, i.e. by granting permits
for free to some existing emitters. [Böhringer–Lange, 2005]
This is a supported instrument in the EU because it is ideal to deal with interna-
tional competitiveness and also has a distributive effect. The implementation of
this measure favours subsidiarity to some extent. 
From the point of view of fostering innovation, it is less effective than GHG
emission taxes. If we accept the assumption that perfect permit markets do not
exist, it is evident that price volatility will be considerable, which could only be
reduced if a price floor as well as a price cap would be set. This would contribute
to the moderation of price volatility and there would create a more favourable cli-
mate for investments in R&D. For the same reason emission trading policy should
be predictable, and stable, to don’t deter investments.
3.5. COMMAND-AND-CONTROL (CAC) APPROACHES
The market instruments described above cannot address market failures as they are
unable to handle information problems and their monitoring is rather difficult.
They strongly depend on the institutional capacities of a country. Therefore, there
are many segments that are not covered by these instruments. CAC approaches can
be efficiently used as a complement. 
This instrument aims to set up environmental standards to oblige abatement
decisions on companies. These standards can be technology related ones, which
dictate companies to use certain low-carbon technology to reduce emissions.
Performance standards can also be set up, i.e. an emission target defined with
regard to the unit [OECD, 2009].
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This is a regulatory and not a market instrument therefore it is inevitable that it
would cause certain distortions. It is not flexible, yet it cannot be adapted to differ-
ent emission and production structures of the companies. It is not able to differen-
tiate the function of the cost structure [Bourniaux et al., 2009].
On the other hand, it can address market failures better, and in the case of the
inefficiency of market instruments, it can also be a better solution. It is ideal to
address information problems. While price elasticity can affect the success of mar-
ket instrument, CAC approaches can be applied in all situations.
Technological minimum standards are set to be achieved by companies. This
measure gives not only an incentive, but also an obligation for emitters to reduce
their GHG emission significantly. However in the case of a company that already
meets this requirement, it gives no motivation to invest in new, more efficient tech-
nologies. A possible hazard is that these standards, by giving no incentives for com-
panies that are already more developed technologically for further innovations,
could freeze the current technological level and as a consequence, they are coun-
terproductive. A more adaptive and flexible instrument would be needed, i.e. it
would be essential that these standards be revised frequently, and be shaped to the
different technological possibilities of firms.
In the case of performance standards, there are more incentives for new inno-
vations. It this case, firms cannot react for emission reduction by reducing pro-
duction, yet an emission per unit is set. The goal of companies would be to find
the ideal technology to increase production without increasing environmental
costs.
This instrument can be studied from the point of view of behavioural econom-
ics. A motivation map can be elaborated from the drives of companies. Companies
are profit-oriented therefore they prefer to take measures that increase benefits.
Emitters do not get direct financial benefit from adopting abatement technologies
or reducing emission per unit. Indirectly, however, they can gain a lot from being
first movers, and get competitive advantages.
Another factor can be that standards, to a great extent, depend from the average
performance of companies. Thus, they are not motivated to invent new, more envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies, because this would make standards increasing-
ly stricter. 
For policy makers it contributes to its popularity that no special institutions are
needed to introduce it, and it can be easily implemented. However it is difficult to
choose appropriate standards on a national level and even more on an internation-
al level. Too lax standards will not make a change; too tight ones, however, would
be unenforceable. 
On an international level, technology standards could be negotiated; however,
national interests would be very different and it would be almost impossible to
find the smallest sum, and as a result, this would not be efficient enough and would
not result in fundamental changes. 
Considering European cooperation with third countries, this instrument could
be built into these projects and conciliated with technology transfers to develop-
ing countries (which are, as we stated above, less willing to introduce emission tax
and cannot incorporate to emission trading schemes).
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3.6. TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT POLICIES
These policies are designed to address innovation failures and to reduce GDP loss-
es attributed to mitigation policy. Implemented as transfers, they would be far
from being cost-effective, yet subsidies would distort market and would not neces-
sarily contribute to a substantial reduction of GHG emission while causing high
monitoring costs.
For the same reason, contrary to the suggestions of the OECD report [OECD,
2009], I question the efficiency of an international fund rewarding innovation.
Doubted is the thing that any “grandfathering” would be efficient in economy, and
in this case a lot of definition problem would arise, and historically such funds can-
not be considered as a success.
In the beginning, R&D investments would mean high initial costs for compa-
nies, while the gains will come only later, and they are quite precarious. Policy mak-
ers can use fiscal instruments or direct subsidies to promote innovation and foster
R&D spending; however these initiatives are not so efficient because innovation
necessities do not come from an internal need of the company but it is an obliga-
tion from the outside. Therefore, an information problem will arise.
It can be a good complement to carbon pricing, because if there is a price on
GHG emission, technology support would canalize innovation in low-carbon, emis-
sion-reducing technologies. Otherwise it cannot be assured that companies invest
in such technologies and not in energy-efficiency. By spending R&D funds on ener-
gy-efficiency, firms will be more competitive, production costs will decrease, and
thus, it will be totally beneficiary and rational for them. Nevertheless, an increased
energy-efficiency will result in lower carbon prices, and in an increased demand
on a global scale. 
Another hazard of this policy is the asymmetric costs for developed countries,
which are supposed to cover most of the spending, and offer these technologies as
a transfer, for developing countries. At a national level, the whole population will
finance R&D investment, while only few inventors will get the benefits. Spread
costs, however can be interpreted as an advantage from the point of view of the
introduction of this policy.
To sum up, we can say that it is a complementary instrument to carbon pricing,
which helps boost innovation and growth and contributes to addressing innova-
tion failures. As a whole, it must only be a secondary measure.
4. WHAT IS THE IDEAL POLICY MIX TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE? 
Pricing GHG emission is inevitable; however, to address its inefficiencies, other,
softer policies should be applied. CAC approaches address information problems
and technology-support policies to mitigate the production decrease from emis-
sion reduction.
A stronger cooperation between the government and companies would be
ideal to deepen the relations between the public and the private sector, and also to
involve universities and higher education in research activities more explicitly. 
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The efficiency of a mitigation policy does not depend only on the selection of
the convenient instrument, but to a great extent on its integration into other poli-
cy areas. For example, a production-supporting agriculture policy would result in
greater emission levels, while a favourable trade policy could promote the diffu-
sion of low-carbon technologies [Mattoo et al., 2009].
Probably some institutional changes would also be necessary to enable the
implementation of mitigation policies. Stronger legal framework could better
enforce emission reduction and could make it easier to monitor compliance with
GHG emission-reducing regulations.
5. THE LEGITIMACY OF A EUROPEAN MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION POLICY
Recent OECD analysis concluded that a particular EU mitigation policy would
have, at a world level, negative effects on a global mitigation policy [OECD, 2009].
According to the argument of the OECD report, as a consequence of carbon leak-
ages, a separate EU policy could reduce the efficiency of global climate policy. 
It can be easily proved that if a smaller group of countries applies emission cuts,
it will not result in a decrease of emission levels globally because these effects are
eliminated by increasing emissions in other regions. Moreover, it may cause larger
mitigation costs for the global community.
If restrictive measures on GHG emission are applied only on some countries,
the producers of these countries will lose competitive advantages at an interna-
tional level compared to their foreign competitors. Therefore, if it is possible, they
will outsource production or some phases of production to non-participant coun-
tries. This means that although in the region where emissions-reducing policy is
implemented, GHG emission will decrease, globally there will be no change in
emission levels. 
The same policy would entail a decrease in the demand for fossil fuels in the
region and therefore a fall in prices, which would make these energy sources
cheaper, and thus more fossil fuel would be used in non-participant countries. 
Table 2 uses the OECD simulation analysis [OECD, 2010] to describe a possible
scenario.
Table 2. Carbon leakage rates
Source: Burniaux et al. [2010]. 
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2020 2050
EU acting alone
CO2 only 13.0% 16%
All GHG 6.3% 11.5%
Region acting
EU acting alone 6.3% 11.5%
Annex I 0.7% 1.7%
Annex I + Brazil, India, China 0.2% 0.7%
According to this model, in the case of a unilateral 50 percent reduction of emis-
sions compared to 2005, leakage would be 11.5 percent of the achieved reduction
achieved by the EU. If emission reduction was the same with larger country cover-
age, carbon leakage would be between 1 and 2  percent [EC 2010].
However, I argue that policy incentives must rise, and it is not surprising that
the first changes can only be implemented in a group of countries and later on, a
global institution can be set up. Therefore, an alternative scenario can be concep-
tualized where GHG reductions are first made in the EU but then global trends fol-
low these initiatives. In this case, although carbon leakages will appear, they will be
lower.
Considering the EU’s competitiveness in the world, although a unilateral GHG
restriction policy would affect production costs negatively, it is still necessary. In
this section I am arguing that, despite undoubted negative consequences, a
European climate mitigation and adaptation policy is needed. Climate change
affects the different common policy areas in which the EU acts. What is more, mit-
igation policies are more enforceable through the EU framework. 
Other factor can be that GHG emission structures are very similar in European
Union Member States. Analysing the Eurostat data on GHG emissions, we can say
that there are no significant differences between the EU 15, and new Member
States.
Source: Eurostat database
Figure 2. Greenhouse gas emissions by sector
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The lack of significant differences in emission structures suggests that a com-
mon European emission-reducing climate policy might have legitimacy, and
should be canalized into common energy, agriculture, and transport policies.
A three-level approach is needed to assess the European climate policy. Carbon
pricing, namely GHG emission taxes, may interfere with national taxation.
Currently fiscal policy is not part of the common policies and we are far from the
existence of a European Economic Governance. However, a stronger European
economic coordination would be necessary to have an efficient climate policy. 
The first level is the national one. Due to the aforementioned reasons, national
policy will rest the dominant one, and European is only a complement. European
states have their own targets to meet Kyoto goals, and they also have their own
measures. As a whole, they are not wrong, however there is a long way to go. 
Source: Eurostat
Figure 3. GHG emission compared to Kyoto 1990
Second is the EU level. In the traditional EU arguments we can read that, due to
“regional variability and severity of climate change” [EC 2010] a coordinated EU
action is needed to face regional and sectoral disparities and to spread the best
practices. The European Union can enforce climate change mitigation measures
through common European policies. A broader framework has been elaborated in
2009 in a White Paper on Adapting to Climate Change. The roadmap laid down an
ambitious project to harmonize EU Climate Policy, but it seems to be rather a polit-
ical incentive than a pragmatic Action Plan. A comprehensive strategy is needed,
which would include the Transport, Energy Efficiency Action Plans, as well as the
reform of the CAP. It is necessary to enhance the EU’s resilience to the impacts of
climate change, and to develop well-elaborated plans to promote energy-efficien-
cy, foster innovations in the green economy, facilitate the spread of the use of
renewable energy sources, keep up with changes in the global economy, and dif-
fuse low-carbon technologies. 
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Third, the EU must think globally. To be competitive on the global market, the
EU must take advantage of its capacities, and invest in green economy and low-car-
bon technologies [Berndes–Hansson 2007]
The actions suggested in the White Paper [EC 2009] are the following. First, it
would be necessary to raise awareness and to build a knowledge base of the
impacts of climate change. A Commission Staff Working Document [EC 2008a] set
up the European Institute of Innovation and Technology with the task to quantify
costs and benefits of adaptation. Within this institution, Knowledge Innovation
Communities (KICs – Climate-KIC, KIC InnoEnergy) and EIT ICTLabs have been
created, which link higher education, research and business sectors. Then adapta-
tion should be integrated into other policy areas. To successfully integrate adapta-
tion action into sectoral policies it is fundamental to assess interaction with other
policy instruments. This is the case with the Common Agricultural Policy, where
fundamental reforms are taking place. The most important priorities are to
enhance the competitiveness of the EU and to contribute to the development of
rural areas. 
CAP, as a whole, is far from being cost-effective. The sustainable production
scheme would mean that the whole financing of the agricultural policy should be
changed and focused on investments and making production and export structure
of the Member States more competitive.
In a post-2013 CAP, a knowledge and invention-based agriculture should be tar-
geted and connected to rural development, which should be separated from social
policy, i.e. transfers should be based on investment capacities, technology diffu-
sion. 
Nevertheless, plans are only plans if there is no financing behind. According to
the Stern Review [Stern Review, 2006] financial constraints are the main barriers
to adaptation. 
How can the EU handle this problem? In the 2007–2013 Financial Framework
[European Council 2007], adaptation to climate change is one of the most impor-
tant priorities. In the European Economic Recovery Plan [EC 2008] there is a spe-
cial emphasis on climate change adaptation policy, i.e. the promotion of energy
efficiency, fostering the production of green energy and the modernization of the
European infrastructure.
An interesting proposition of this paper is the coverage of certain strategic pub-
lic or private investments by weather-related insurances. This suggestion should be
further analysed in the future. The PES (Payment for Ecosystem Services) would be
designed to build public-private partnerships to share investments, risks and it
would recycle the revenue generated from auctioning allowances.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper I assessed, that a mitigation and adaptation policy is needed to
address climate change. Policy instruments should be selected very carefully, yet
they have substantial impact on the real economy, on the GDP, and they have
employment effects. Therefore, market-based instruments and complementary,
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innovation-promoting instruments should be applied to reach a sustainable
growth. New motors of economic growth could be detected in the green economy
and renewable energy sources, which could foster innovation, contribute to pro-
duction growth and create employment. 
The EU has published many action plans to face climate change, but lacks the
appropriate financial instruments and coherence with other common policies. In
the future, a more pronounced competitiveness-promoting and innovation-based
adaptation policy should be elaborated, together with market-based financial
instruments.
REFERENCES
Ambec S. and P. Lanoie [2008] “Does it pay to be green? A systematic overview”
Academy of Management Perspectives, November, 45–62.
Babiker, M. H. and R. S. Eckaus [2007] “Unemployment effects of climate policy”
Environmental Science and Policy, 10: 600–609.
Berg N. and D. Holtbrügger [1997] “Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Nationen: Der
Diamant-Ansatz von Porter.” WiSt 4: 199–201
Berndes, G.–Hansson, J. [2007] “Physical Resource Theory” Department of Energy
and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology, SE-412 96 Göteborg,
Sweden
Böhringer, C–Lange, A. [2005], On the Design of Optimal Grandfathering Schemes
for Emission Allowances, European Economic Review 49, 2041-2055.
Burniaux J. M., J. Chateau, R. Dellink, R. Duval and S. Jamet [2009] “The economics
of climate change mitigation: how to build the necessary global action in a
cost-effective manner”, OECD Economics Department Working paper No.
701.
Burniaux J. M., J. Chateau, and R. Duval [2010] “Is there a case for carbon-based bor-
der tax adjustment? An applied general equilibrium analysis”, OECD
Economics Department Working Paper No. 794.
Dellink, R. B. et al. [2010] “Towards Global Carbon Pricing : Direct and Indirect
Linking of Carbon Markets”, OECD Environmental Working Paper No. 20.
EU [2001]: Proposal for a Framework Directive for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading within the European Community, COM [2001]581, European
Commission, Brussels. 
European Council [2007] Financial Perspective 2007–2013 http://www.consili-
um.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/87677.pdf
EC [2008] A European Economic Recovery Plan
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication13504_en.pdf
EC [2008a] Commission Staff Working Document: Integrated climate change
research following the release of the 4th Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and most recent
research developments, SEC 2008 3104, Brussels
EC [2009] White Paper: Adapting to climate change: Towards a European frame-
work for action, COM 2009 147/4, Brussels
140 KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2011/4
EC [2010] Analysis of options to move beyond 20 percent greenhouse gas emission
reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, COM[2010] 265 final,
European Commission, Brussels
IPCC [2007] The physical science basis. Summary for policy makers. Contribution
of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change. Intergovernmental panel on climate
change, Geneva
Lintz, G. [1992] Umweltpolitik und Beschäftigung. Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung Band 159. Nürnberg
Mattoo, A., A. Subramanian, D. van der Mensbrugghe, and J. He. [2009],
“Reconciling Climate Change and trade Policy”, CGD Working Paper No 189.
Nordhaus, W. [2002] “Modeling Induced Innovation in Climate-Change Policy”. In
Technological Change and the Environment, edited by A. Grübler, N.
Nakicenovic and W. D. Nordhaus. Washington: Resources for the Future
Nordhaus W. D. [2007] “A review of the Stern Review on the economics of climate
change” Journal of Economic Literature 45: 686–702.
OECD [2009] The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation Policies and Options
for Global Action beyond 2012. OECD, Paris
Owen, A. D.–Hanley N. (2004) The Economics of Climate Change, Routledge, New
York
Parry, I. and W. E. Oates [2000] “Policy Analysis in the Presence of Distorting Taxes”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19: 603–614.
Parry I. and A. Bento [2000] “Tax-deductible spending, environmental policy, and
the double dividend hypothesis” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 39: 67–96
Pizer, W. A. [1999] “Optimal choice of policy instrument and stringency under
uncertainty: the case of climate change” Resource and Energy Economics
21(3–4): 255–287.
Pizer, W. A. [2002] “Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global cli-
mate change” In: Journal of Public Economics 85(3):409–434.
Pizer, W. A. and L. H. Goulder [2006] “The Economics of Climate Change” NBER
Working Paper 11923 
Porter, M. E. [1990] The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press, 
Porter M. E. and C. van der Linde [1995] “Toward a new conception of the environ-
ment-competitiveness relationship” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:
97–118.
Stern Review [2007] The Economics of Climate Change, HM Treasury
Tulkens, H. [1998] “Cooperation Versus Free Riding” In: Game Theory and the
Environment, edited by N. Hanley and H. Folmer. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
141IZABELLA FEIERABEND: MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
